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 1. Introduction
In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus' publication of his  De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium 
began  the  Copernican  revolution  and  contributed  to  the  rise  of  the  ensuing  scientific 
revolution. The term “Copernican revolution” refers to the theory or paradigm shift away 
from the Ptolemaic model of the heavens towards the Copernican. The Ptolemaic model 
postulates  the  Earth  at  the  centre  of  the  galaxy (i.e.  a  geocentric  model),  whereas  the 
Copernican one postulates the Sun at the centre (i.e. a heliocentric model). In 1610, Galileo 
Galilei provided support for the Copernican theory by observations with a telescope he had 
just constructed. Towards this end he observed inter alias the phases of the planet Venus. 
Based  on  these  observations,  Galilei  published  in  1632  a  book  which  defends  the 
heliocentric system. The English translation of the book is entitled Dialogue Concerning 
the Two Chief World Systems.1 
Roughly 330 years later, Paul K. Feyerabend, a Western philosopher of science, examines 
the Copernican revolution in his book Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory  
of Knowledge. In this book Feyerabend takes the premise that Galileo's advancing of a 
heliocentric cosmology was an example of scientific progress. I agree on this premiss. He 
then tries to show that Galileo did not adhere to the conditions of critical rationalism. For 
this criticism of falsificationism he uses Galilei's observations with the telescope as a prime  
example. Feyerabend even argues that if Galileo had adhered to critical rationalism, then 
he  could  not  have  advanced  a  heliocentric  cosmology.  On  this  point  I  disagree  with 
Feyerabend,  and  I  want  to  show that  this  latter  claim is  false.  The  essay's  aim is  to 
examine,  whether  there  is  a  tenable  falsificationist  reply  to  Feyerabend's  criticism.  I 
examine in particular, whether Galilei has defended the Copernican theory according to or 
at  least  compossible  with  critical  rationalism.  In  consequence of  the  examination,  one 
could even say that my project turns Feyerabend's own prime example against himself. 
The structure of the argumentation is as follows: In chapter 2, I confront Feyerabend's 
position and critical  rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point  for my 
(historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is 
the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced 
that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican 
1 The German version of Galilei's book is entitled Dialog über die beiden hauptsächlichen Weltsysteme: das  
Ptolemäische und das Kopernikanische. 
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revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was 
supported by deficient hypotheses, and falsifications were disposed by ad hoc hypotheses 
and  propaganda.  Furthermore,  he  claims  that  his  philosophy  of  science  reconstructs 
Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. He introduces a central principle of his position,  
(the principle of tenacity) in order to justify a research strategy of not eliminating falsified 
theories. He tries to show that the tenacious defence of a theory corresponds to Galilei's 
defence  of  the  Copernican  theory.  Remarkably,  Feyerabend's  approach  to  explain  the 
development  of  science  earns  an  important  support  from his  interpretation  of  Galilei's 
observations. 
In  chapter  3,  I  give  a  falsificationist  interpretation  of  Galilei's  observations  with  the 
telescope,  and  oppose  this  interpretation  to  Feyerabend's.  From  a  falsificationist 
perspective,  auxiliary hypotheses compete  during the  Copernican  revolution which can 
(with some effort) be critically discussed. In chapter 4, I analyse the historical case in order 
to test Feyerabend's interpretation of the Copernican revolution.  Inter alias I investigate 
thoroughly  whether  Galilei,  as  Feyerabend  claims,  immunised  falsifications  of  the 
Copernican theory by the introduction of  ad hoc hypotheses. The investigation considers 
Galilei's explanation of Venus' phases, his establishment of the irradiation hypothesis, the 
explanation  of  the  telescope's  functionality,  and  the  role  of  the  reproducibility  of  the 
observations with the telescope. In chapter 5, I finally provide a rational reconstruction of 
Galilei's falsification of the Ptolemaic theory. The formalisation shows that Galilei was not 
a  cautious  critical  rationalist,  but  a  very  confident  scientist  using  the  method  of 
falsification.
  
 2. Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism in Differentiation to 
Critical Rationalism
Paul Feyerabend is considered to be a representative of the “new philosophy of science”. 
As the other representatives of this movement, he criticised the positivistic or logically 
empiricist  philosophy  of  science.  However,  his  criticism  concerns  besides  logical 
empiricism also  Sir  Karl  Popper's  methodology.  He reproaches  the  founder  of  critical 
rationalism for the ambition to perceive science as rational. According to Feyerabend this 
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is untenable. He refers to the ambition of critical rationalists as “ratiomania”, which means 
immoderate preference for rationality, not to say pathological passion therefor. 
In 1970, Feyerabend calls his position epistemological anarchism.2 He regards science as 
fallible and experience as theory-dependent. So far his views are in agreement with critical 
rationalism. In contradistinction to it, Feyerabend does not think that a critical and rational 
discussion  of  competing  theories  is  possible;  for  the  theory-dependence  of  experience 
makes  competing  theories  incommensurable.  Since  he  thinks  that  theories  are 
incommensurable,  there  is  no  common  basis  for  such  (actually  desirable)  critical 
discussions, and thus theories have to be discussed in an anarchistic way by using rhetoric 
and propaganda. In order to show this concretely Feyerabend picks out of the history of 
science an example: Galileo's defence of the Copernican theory.
Feyerabend tries to show that Galileo defended the Copernican theory (CT) according to 
his epistemological anarchism. In the time of Galileo, some phenomena were observable 
by the naked eye which were problematic for the CT, for instance the brightness and size 
variations  of  planets.  Feyerabend  claims  that  Galileo  immunised  these  apparent 
falsifications by introducing an ad hoc hypothesis, namely that the telescope is reliable. In 
other words, Galileo's assumption of the telescope's reliability shows that he did not mind 
falsifications or removed them by immunising auxiliary hypotheses.
 2.1. Galilei's Utilisation of the Telescope and its Anarchistic Interpretation
Before the telescope was invented, observations with the naked eye had been conducted 
which presumably falsified the CT. The theories of Copernicus and Ptolemy assume that 
the distances between the Earth and the planets vary. With your own eyes you can see 
brightness and size variations of the planets; but these variations are way to small as you 
can  expect  on  the  ground of  what  both theories  predict.  Galileo  paid  attention  to  the 
problem of the planet's variations concerning brightness and apparent size. According to 
him, Copernicus says nothing about the almost unvarying size of Venus when observed by 
the naked eye.3  
2  Cf. Feyerabend, P. K., Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, 1st edition.
3 Cf.  Galilei,  G.,  Dialog  über  die  beiden  hauptsächlichen  Weltsysteme:  das  Ptolemäische  und  das  
Kopernikanische, p. 349.
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When Galileo observed the planets with his telescope, which was a new instrument back 
then, he made remarkable discoveries. Equipped with his telescope, he was able to observe 
the  planets'  variations  more  precisely than  with the  mere eye.  His  observations  of  the 
planets' brightness and size variations  via telescope were in accordance with the values 
predicted by Copernicus. According to Feyerabend this accordance proved for Galileo the 
truth of the CT and the usefulness of the telescope.4
Feyerabend adds that the auxiliary hypothesis of the telescope's reliability (AH1) had been 
very insecure at the beginning: Galileo's first observations of the Moon via telescope were 
problematic; for his first maps of the Moon weren't right after his observations with the 
telescope.  The values,  obtained by the different  modes of observation,  differed for  the 
planets'  brightness  and  size  variations.  If  observations  with  the  naked  eye  contradict 
observations with the telescope, why should we assume that observations by telescope are 
reliable?  What  could  Galileo  oppose  to  the  theory  of  his  antagonists  (influenced  by 
Aristoteles' theory) that exclusively the naked eye is reliable and the telescope distorts?5
Feyerabend argues further that the  CT was supported by deficient auxiliary hypotheses 
(e.g.  AH1), and refutations were disposed by  ad hoc  hypotheses and artful propaganda.6 
Such irrational methods of support had been necessary according to him because of the 
“unbalanced development” of the CT and its auxiliary hypotheses: AH1 was necessary for 
the (back then) new CT, however, AH1 was developed after the construction of the CT. He 
wants to express that the new theory with the old auxiliary hypotheses (for instance the 
assumption  of  the  reliability  of  observations  with  the  naked  eye)  could  be  falsified. 
Feyerabend perceives such later-introduced auxiliary hypotheses as ad hoc hypotheses.7
In summary, Feyerabend aims to show that Galileo's observations via telescope contradict 
observations with the naked eye, for instance, the observations of Venus' brightness and 
size variations.  He interprets  this  as  evidence for the claim that Galileo defended  AH1 
according to his epistemological anarchism (more precisely: according to his principle of 
tenacity), and that Galileo ignored problems and even falsifications. 
4 Cf. Feyerabend, P. K., Wider den Methodenzwang, 2nd edition, p. 185. Feyerabend mentions only Mars' size 
variations, Galilei in his Dialog on p. 350 also the size variations of Venus.
5 Cf. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, pp. 128-68. 
6 Cf. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, p. 187.
7 Cf. ibid., pp. 188-202.
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 2.2.Feyerabend's Principle of Tenacity and the Thesis of 
Incommensurability
Feyerabend suggests a principle of tenacity according to which scientists should stick more 
or less dogmatically to theories in spite of considerable difficulties. First and foremost, 
such difficulties would be falsifications,  as he argues in  his  historical case studies.  He 
introduces this principle in order to justify a research strategy of not eliminating falsified 
theories: “Having adopted tenacity we can no longer use recalcitrant facts for removing a 
theory […] even if the facts should happen to be as plain and straight-forward as daylight 
itself”.8    
Feyerabend  thinks  that  the  principle  of  tenacity  is  rational,  because  theories  can  be 
developed  and  improved,  test  statements  can  be  rejected,  and  (problematic)  auxiliary 
hypotheses changed. By modifying and developing a theory you might improve it so much 
that earlier problems are solved. Observational and experimental errors are possible, and it 
takes time to get uniform experimental results. Explicit auxiliary hypotheses are used in 
order to derive test statements; implicit auxiliary hypotheses are used in order to decide 
what test statements to accept and what concepts to use in order to describe observations.
Feyerabend tries to show that the tenacious defence of a theory can be rational. For this 
aim he uses historical cases, for instance Galileo's defence of the Copernican theory. He 
thinks  that  these  examples  indicate  that  research  in  our world  according  to  the 
falsificationist methodology meets insurmountable difficulties. For instance, the Ptolemaic 
and the Copernican theory were falsified by observations with the mere eye. In this world, 
the method of falsification would annihilate science. However, even though most theories 
are falsified, it is nevertheless rational according to the principle of tenacity to continue to 
work  on  them  and  to  develop  them.  In  this  way  Feyerabend  tries  to  show  that 
falsificationism is a methodology that is (logically)  possible but cannot be used in actual 
research.9
Moreover, Feyerabend holds as mentioned before the thesis of incommensurability, that is, 
he does not believe that a theory can be criticised with theory-independent experience. The 
incommensurability  of  theories  would not  fully  exclude  the  possibility  of  falsification, 
because  incommensurable  theories  could  be  falsified  by  using  their  own  kind  of 
experience.  Without  a  commensurable  alternative,  however,  these  refutations  are  quite 
8 Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, p. 205.
9 Cf. Feyerabend, P. K., Science in a Free Society, p. 227.
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weak. It  is  impossible  to compare the empirical  contents of theories  except  within the 
confines of a particular theory. Hence, Popper's methods for showing that there is progress 
in science cannot be used. The method of refutation, which can be used, is very much 
reduced in strength. “What remains are aesthetic judgements, judgements of taste, and our 
own subjective wishes.”10
As aforementioned, Feyerabend is convinced that actually desirable criticism and theory 
change can only be achieved by anarchistic means. According to him criticism of a theory 
requires another theory. On this background, the pluralism of theories in epistemological 
anarchism has another significance than to critical rationalists which regard this pluralism 
as desirable but not necessary for criticism. Radical falsificationists hold the antithesis to 
Feyerabend's incommensurability claim: A common empirical basis can always be found. 
This means nothing else than the thesis of incommensurability would be a certain myth.11 
 3. A Falsificationist Interpretation of Observations with and 
without the Telescope 
When Galilei observed Venus' brightness and size variations  via the telescope which he 
constructed, he discovered that these observations are in accordance with the predictions of 
the Copernican theory (CT), but not with the predictions of the Ptolemaic theory (PT). The 
observations with the telescope yielded, for instance, to other values for Venus' brightness 
and size variations than observations without the telescope. Only the observations of these 
variations  with  the  telescope agreed  with  the  CT.  Feyerabend  argues  that  Galileo  as 
supporter of the  CT assumed the reliability of the telescope, whilst supporters of the  PT 
doubted this  reliability.  Does this show, as Feyerabend intends,  that the Ptolemaic and 
Copernican theory are incommensurable with respect to Optics?
In order to give an answer to the question of incommensurability from the view of critical 
rationalism,  it  is  helpful,  to  distinguish  clearly  between  two  problems  which  can  be 
expressed in the following questions: (1) What can be observed with the telescope? (2) Are 
observations  with  the  telescope  or  with  the  mere  eye  reliable?  The  first  problem  is 
10 Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, p. 228.
11 Cf. Popper, K. R., “Normal Science and its Dangers”, p. 56.
8
empirical,  the second  theoretical.  (1) is a problem of test statements, (2) a problem of 
accepted auxiliary hypotheses.
The test statements about the observations of the planets' brightness and size variations 
using the telescope, and the other test statements about the same observations but using the 
unequipped eye  were  relatively unproblematic.  After  the  “childhood diseases”  (i.e.  the 
initial problems) of the telescope were overcome, an intersubjective agreement about the 
observations  of  the  planets'  variations  with  the  telescope  could  be  achieved.  The 
observations  of  the  same  phenomena  with  the  mere  eye  were  never  problematic.  In 
contradistinction,  it  was problematic which type of observations was reliable,  and thus 
could be accepted: The auxiliary hypothesis of the reliability of the naked eye (AH0), or the 
auxiliary hypothesis of the reliability of the telescope (AH1). 
As long as the auxiliary hypotheses about the telescope and the mere eye were implicit, the 
impression could occur that the  PT and the  CT were incommensurable with respect to 
Optics;  that  means in  this  case that  the  supporters  of  both theories  supposed different 
values for the planets' brightness and size variations (for instance Venus' values). However, 
critical rationalists presuppose the following: If the supposed auxiliary hypotheses can be 
expressed  explicitly,  then  they  can  be  discussed,  and  furthermore  unproblematic  test 
statements  about  the  observations  of  Venus  with  the  telescope  and  without  can  be 
established. 
From a falsificationist perspective, Feyerabend's example does not show at all that the PT 
and the  CT were incommensurable  with  respect  to  Optics,  but  that  supporters  of  both 
theories supposed different auxiliary hypotheses. It  is not to understand without further 
ado,  why  the  reliability  of  the  telescope  has  to  be  discussed  “anarchistically”,  as 
Feyerabend  claims,  by  rhetoric  and  propaganda.  Instead  of  an  anarchistic  discussion, 
different auxiliary hypotheses could be discussed,  that is  for a falsificationist  a normal 
scientific  procedure.  However,  Feyerabend's  example  is  nevertheless  interesting;  for  it 
shows how important it is that problematic auxiliary hypotheses, which are implicit, can be 
made explicit. Only if such a hypothesis is explicit, it can be discussed and empirically 
tested.  The history of science shows that problems could sometimes be solved first  by 
expressing explicitly tacitly supposed auxiliary hypotheses; this is a necessary requirement 
to contest a (not anymore implicit) hypothesis.12 The manifest auxiliary hypothesis, that the 
12 Copi, I. M.,  Introduction to Logic,  p. 511: „Perhaps the most significant lesson to be learned from the 
preceding discussion is the importance of scientific process of dragging „hidden assumptions“ into the open.  
[…] Because  they are hidden,  there  is  no chance  to  examine such assumptions critically  and  to  decide  
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planets' brightness and size variations can be observed by the naked eye, is an example 
thereof. 
It  is  neither  possible  nor  necessary  to  express  always all  implicit  auxiliary hypotheses 
explicitly.  But  it  is  significant  indeed  that  single  implicit  auxiliary  hypotheses  can be 
principially expressed explicitly. This possibility is of particular importance, if an implicit 
auxiliary hypothesis is problematic as it was the case in Galileo's time with AH1 expressing 
that the telescope is a reliable instrument.
Nowadays, one wouldn't express (AH1) explicitly, but one would treat this hypothesis as 
unproblematic background knowledge. In case this hypothesis should be problematised for 
any reason, it can be made explicit to any time, and thus be critically discussed. In the time 
of Galileo, it was highly problematic, whether the telescope would be reliable. Therefore it 
was back then desirable from an falsificationist point of view that (AH1) was expressed 
explicitly. 
Galileo and his opponents discussed whether the observations with the telescope or with 
the mere eye were reliable. It was a discussion about the validity of different auxiliary 
hypotheses. In contrast, the test statements of the observations with the naked eye and the 
telescope respectively were relatively unproblematic. Accordingly, Galileo did not doubt 
that Venus' brightness and size variations observed without the telescope are small; rather 
he doubted  AH0 expressing that the planets' variations can be observed reliably with the 
naked  eye.  For  a  falsificationist,  the  discussion  about  the  auxiliary  hypotheses  had 
immense consequences. In case Galileo's  conjecture  AH1 was correct, then the  PT was 
falsified. In contrast,  if the observations of the planets with the mere eye were reliable 
(AH0), then the dispute between the two rival astronomical theories was not decided yet. 
Let us take a closer look at the historical dispute.  
 4. Galilei's Observations en  Détail
Let me briefly restate Feyerabend's stance on Galilei's observations: He tries to show that 
Galilei  defended  the  CT with  ad  hoc hypotheses  which  immunised  falsifications.  The 
intelligently  whether  they  are  true  or  false.  Progress  is  often  achieved  by  formulating  explicitly  an 
assumption which had previously been hidden and then scrutinizing and rejecting it.“
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conducted  observations  of  the  planets'  size  variations  without  the  telescope weren't  in 
accordance with the predictions of the CT. In contradistinction, Galilei's observations with 
the telescope were in accordance with the predictions of Copernicus'  theory.  However, 
Galilei's  optical  auxiliary  hypothesis  of  the  telescope's  reliability  were  established 
according to  Feyerabend only  after  the  CT has  been introduced  in  order  to  immunise 
particular falsifications. Is Feyerabend right and thus Galilei's defence of the CT a defence 
with the help of ad hoc hypotheses? In this chapter I try to find an answer to this question, 
and to discuss the significance of Galilei's observations. 
 4.1. The Explanation of Venus' Phases
Let  us  consider  the  discussion  about  the  planets'  brightness  variations.  Some  of  the 
necessary optical auxiliary hypotheses were problematic, e.g. it was unknown whether the 
planets  emit  their  “own”  light,  or  radiate  with  reflected  light.  Since  such  auxiliary 
hypotheses were problematic, it  is  not astonishing that neither Copernicus nor Ptolemy 
tried to explain exactly the planets' brightness variations. Facing the problematic character 
of the auxiliary hypotheses, the problem was kept open. In any case we cannot speak of a 
falsification of the CT with unproblematic auxiliary hypotheses.13
Galilei's observations of the planets with the telescope showed a way how to resolve the 
open problem of the brightness variations. With the telescope the planets' variations could 
be  observed  clearly  for  the  first  time,  and  the  observations  agreed  with  the  CT.  The 
telescope also rendered possible to observe the planets' phases, especially the phases of the 
inner planets like Venus.  Galilei  was able to  explain the almost constant  brightness of 
Venus  as  follows:  If  Venus is  at  the  nearest  point  relative  to  the  Earth,  then  it  looks 
crescent-shaped (like the new Moon). Hence, Venus is not that bright in Earth's proximity 
as one could have expected. If Venus is at the most remote point relative to the Earth, then 
it  looks circular (like the full  Moon). Since the whole illuminated surface of Venus is 
directed to the Earth (when Venus is at great distance from the Earth), it appears relatively 
13 In an anonymous preface to Copernicus' magnum opus (De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium) Osiander 
mentions the problem of the brightness variations in order to recommend an instrumentalistic interpretation 
of the  CT. According to Feyerabend, Osiander shows that a realistic interpretation of the  CT contradicted 
obvious facts (cf. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, p. 144). Perhaps Osiander just wanted to diminish 
the  expected  resistance  of  philosophers  and  theologians  against  a  realistic  interpretation  of  Copernicus' 
theory. 
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bright.  Venus'  distance  and  size  variations  are  almost  entirely  compensated  by  the 
variations of its phases.14
Galilei's observations showed how the problem of the brightness and size variations could 
be solved. Also the solution to some other problems were found thereby.  For instance, 
before Galilei  it  was unknown, whether the planets emit their own light, or shine with 
reflected sunlight. Copernicus claimed that Venus has phases like the Moon, if it solely 
reflects light. Since such phases cannot be observed by the mere eye, Copernicus assumed 
that  Venus  is  self-shining,  or  that  it  has  a  very  extraordinary  matter  which  is  “fully 
saturated” by the sunlight. However, Galilei's discovery of Venus' phases shows that Venus 
has the predicted phases, and thus that it shines with reflected light.15 In the face of this 
background knowledge, Galilei's introduction of new auxiliary hypotheses (in particular 
AH1) does not seem to be ad hoc, but well-motivated. 
From a falsificationist angle, it was even more important that the observations of Venus 
phases allowed for the first time a crucial experiment between Ptolemy's and Copernicus' 
theory.  The  planets'  positions  can  be  explained  approximately  equally  well  by  both 
theories. In case the planets shine with reflected sunlight, both theories predict that the 
planets should show phases like the Moon. However, the theories predict different phases. 
The difference was especially clear when Venus was in a great distance to the Earth (i.e. for 
Venus in and near to the superior conjunction). As already mentioned, the CT entails that 
Venus at a great distance relative to the Earth should look circular (“full” Venus). The PT, 
au  contraire,  implies  that  Venus  at  a  great  distance  relative  to  the  Earth  should  look 
crescent-shaped (“new” Venus). Equipped with the telescope, Galilei was able to observe 
that, when Venus was in the superior conjunction, then it was almost full. The observation 
agrees  with  the  CT's  prognosis,  and  falsified  the  PT.  To  this  important  observation 
Feyerabend merely comments that Venus' phases do not render the Copernican hypothesis 
of the Earth movement more evident,  since it  can also be explained by Tycho Brahe's 
geocentric theory.16 
As P. Duhem had suggested before, Feyerabend argues that a crucial experiment cannot 
prove the truth of a hypothesis.17 In a falsificationist methodology however, is the function 
of a crucial  experiment not  to prove a hypothesis,  but to falsify one of two (or more) 
14 Cf. Price, Derek J. de Solla, Contra-Copernicus, pp. 197-218, especially p. 213.
15 Cf. Galilei, Dialog, pp. 349-350.
16 Cf. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, p. 170 and p. 254.
17 Cf. Duhem, Pierre M. M., La Théorie physique. Son objet – sa structure, pp. 252-53.
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competing hypotheses. The observations of Venus' phases at a great distance relative to the 
Earth do not prove the truth of the  CT, of course, this can no observation. However, the 
observations falsified the  PT. This is important enough and shows that the observations 
with the telescope exceeded its propagandistic value.18 
 4.2. The Establishment of the Irradiation Hypothesis
From a  theoretical  point  of  view,  the  discussion  about  Galilei's  observations  with  the 
telescope  was  a  dispute  between  auxiliary  hypotheses.  Seen  from  the  position  of  a 
consequent  fallibilism,  Feyerabend's  claim is  not  astonishing that  the first  observations 
with the telescope were problematic. In contrast, his claim is astonishing that a rational 
discussion of the relevant auxiliary hypotheses is not possible. According to Feyerabend, 
Galilei could support the auxiliary hypothesis of the telescope's reliability (AH1) only with 
irrational and anarchistic means. Feyerabend does not consider that AH1 was independently 
testable from the astronomical theories, and as the history of science shows was indeed 
tested. Feyerabend's assumption that the  AH1 can only be discussed together with a new 
cosmology and  a  new world  view seems to  be  inspired  by  a  philosophically  inspired 
holistic dogma. 
Whether observations with the telescope or with the mere eye are reliable, is independent 
of the correctness of the  PT or the  CT. Galilei didn't claim that the telescope is reliable, 
because the observations with it agreed with the CT. In lieu thereof he tested the competing 
auxiliary  hypotheses  independently  from  astronomical  theories.  He  observes  that  for 
example Jupiter appears brighter and greater (i.e. the apparent magnitude or size of Jupiter 
is bigger), if it is observed in total darkness. In the dawn, however, Jupiter appears pretty 
small when observed with the mere eye. The same counts for other bright planets. In order 
to explain these phenomena, Galilei establishes the hypothesis of  irradiation. Against a 
dark background, bright and point-shaped objects are perceived too big. The emergence of 
such a misperception can easily be tested independently. The irradiation does not emerge, 
if there is no dark background, for instance, if a bright planet is observed through a hole in 
18 Cf. Popper,  Conjectures and Refutations, p. 112, footnote 26: “Duhem in his famous criticism of crucial 
experiments […] suceeds in showing that crucial experiments can never establish a theory. He fails to show 
that they cannot refute it.”
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a white piece of paper or through a tube. Hence, Galilei says that an obstacle, which comes 
from the eye itself, plays an important role when you observe bright planets.
The irradiation hypothesis explains, why the observations of the planets' size variations 
with the naked eye didn't agree with the PT and the CT. The size variations were based on 
a  misperception,  the  irradiation.  Without  the  irradiation,  the  planets  look  point-shaped 
when observed with the eye.  The planets'  size variations are  not  observable  without  a 
telescope. With the telescope, Galilei was able to observe the variations, and that these 
variations were in accordance with the CT. 
The discovery of  irradiation enabled Galilei  to  criticise the auxiliary hypothesis  of  the 
reliability of the mere eye (AH0). The auxiliary hypothesis of the reliability of the telescope 
could be tested independently by the observation of distant objects on the Earth. According 
to Feyerabend, the telescope impressed the – back then – contemporary literature as mean 
to improve the  seeing on earth.19 He claims, however, that the telescope's application in 
astronomy is another story. In order to show that the astronomical observations with the 
telescope were problematic, he offers the following reason: Galilei drew a moon crater too 
big.20
 4.3. The Moon and the Explanation of the Telescope's Functionality
I  argue  against  Feyerabend  that  Galilei's  drawings  of  the  Moon's  surface  in  Siderius  
Nuncius do not show that the telescope was unreliable. In this first publication about his 
observations with the telescope it was not Galilei's aim to draw an exact map of the moon, 
but to show that  there are mountains on the moon.21 No high degree of exactness was 
required in order to refute the hypothesis of the Moon's  perfectly spheric  form. It  was 
sufficient to show how the shadows and the bright parts of a Moon mountain changed by 
varying lighting. Galilei was content therewith to draw a Moon mountain – a bit too great 
and with varying lighting. If Galilei's problem situation is properly understood, then the 
pedantic objection that he hasn't drawn an exact map of the moon loses its justification.22
19 Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, p. 139.
20 Cf. Ibid, pp. 155-58, and Galilei, G., Sidereus Nuncius, p. 92.
21 Cf. Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius, pp. 87-88. The unevenness of the Moon's surface wasn't a matter of course, 
but an important discovery, which falsified the Aristotelian hypothesis that the Moon is perfectly spheric.
22 Cf. Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius. On p. 92 a Moon mountain is pictured with highly varying lighting.
14
Directly after Siderius Nuncius was published, in which Galilei reports on his observations 
with  the  telescope  for  the  first  time,  Kepler  mentioned  the  necessity  to  explain  the 
telescope's functionality. Already in 1611 he succeeds to explain optically how Galilei's 
telescope functions  and to  specify how a better  telescope can be  constructed.  Kepler's 
telescope was later commonly used for astronomical observations.  
Feyerabend tries to show that  Kepler's  explanation of the telescope's  functionality  was 
unsatisfactory, because the explanation was based on falsified hypotheses. As falsification 
of Kepler's optic, he argues that an object, which is in the focal plane of a convex lense, is  
not seen infinitely distant if observed through the lense.23 If one observes objects being in 
the  focal  plane  of  a  convex  lense,  then  the  telemetric  triangle  reaches  infinity  (as 
Feyerabend notes). However, it does not follow from this that the objects are  seen in an 
infinite  distance.  Kepler's  geometrical  optic  is  only  a  theory about  how light  rays  are 
refracted in lenses. That the telemetric triangle reaches infinity means only that the light 
rays are after the refraction in a lense parallel. This prognosis of his geometrical optic is 
correct and can be tested independently by the experimental examination of the light rays' 
refraction in the focal plane of a convex lense. In contradistinction, the geometrical optic is 
not able to explain how objects are seen through lenses. Hence, Feyerabend errs when he 
negates  that  Kepler  could  explain  the  telescope's  mode  of  functioning.  Feyerabend's 
falsifying prognosis is not a consequence of Kepler's optic, his discussion is based on a 
fallacy. The telemetric triangle is in the geometrical optic only a mean in order to be able to  
calculate  refractions of  light  rays.  These  refractions  could be  calculated  approximately 
correct using Kepler's optic.  Summa summarum Kepler could explain optically how the 
telescope functions as well as specify the plan for the construction of a better one. 
 4.4. Galilei's Incautious Defence of the Copernican Theory based on 
Reproducibility
If the  auxiliary  hypothesis  of  the  telescope's  reliability  is  correct,  then  Galilei's  
observations of Venus'  phases and the planets'  size variations falsify the  PT.  This is  a 
conditioned falsification.  If  the  telescope  is  reliable,  and Venus is  full  in  the  superior 
conjunction, then the  PT is false. This falsification requires not only test statements, but 
also the corroboration of the auxiliary hypothesis AH1. Indeed, it is correct that Galilei did 
23 Cf. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, p. 152, footnote 22.
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not  argue  cautiously  or  hypothetically,  that  he  didn't  claim  the  Ptolemaic  system  is 
falsified,  if the  telescope is  reliable.  Instead he claimed with  great  confidence  that  the 
telescope is reliable and thus the  PT falsified. However, this does not show that rhetoric 
and propaganda played an important role. Galilei's auxiliary hypotheses were criticised by 
many other scientists. The acceptance of Galilei's observations with the telescope is less 
based  on  his  skillful  argumentation than  on  the  reproducibility  of  his  observations. 
Presumably, the most artful rhetoric would not have been sufficient in order to convince 
Galilei's numerous opponents of the existence of Venus' phases, if they had not been able to 
observe them with the telescope on their own. 
Feyerabend objects that the reproducibility of a phenomenon does not show its “reality 
character”.24 This is correct. Many misperceptions, e.g. the irradiation of bright planets, are 
reproducible. The problem, however, is not to show or to prove that phenomena have a 
“reality character”, or that observations are reliable. Such proofs are not possible from a 
falsificationist  angle.  The problem is  to  criticise the reliability of observations,  to  give 
arguments which are directed against the “reality character” of phenomena. In order to 
show that  there is  a  misperception,  some reproducible  counter-experiment  needs to  be 
specified.  In  his  discussion of  the  irradiation,  Galilei  specified such experiments,  what 
Feyerabend desists in his discussion about the telescope's reliability. In place of specifying 
reproducible  counter-experiments,  Feyerabend  contents  himself  with  discussing  some 
problematic single-observations like Galilei's first drawings of the Moon.
 5. A Rational Reconstruction of Galilei's Falsification of the 
Ptolemaic Theory
According to Feyerabend, Galileo protected the Copernican theory (CT) against criticism 
by introduction of a new optical auxiliary hypothesis (AH1), namely that the telescope is a 
reliable instrument for the observation of the planets' brightness and size variations. This 
new  AH1 does not modify the  CT, but is a necessary auxiliary hypothesis:  without this 
hypothesis Galileo wouldn't have been able to use observations  via telescope in order to 
24 Cf. Feyerabend, Wider den Methodenzwang, p. 153, footnote 22. 
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test the theory.  AH1 thus does not modify the  CT as Feyerabend claims, but the whole 
theoretical system which is used for the deduction of predictions.
In order to derive from the Ptolemaic theory (PT), and boundary conditions (I) a prediction 
(P), the auxiliary hypothesis AH0 of the reliability of the naked eye is used:
(1) I, PT, AH0 ⊢ P
If P is not observed as it was actually the case, then the theoretical system, that consists of 
the conjunction of PT and AH0, is falsified.
(2) I, ¬P ⊢ ¬(PT ∧ AH0)
It  is  possible  that  the falsification grounds on the falsehood of  AH0.  Therefore,  it  is  a 
rationally legitimated research strategy to replace the old  AH0 by a new AH1; this means 
that a part of the theoretical system, namely PT ∧ AH0 is modified to PT ∧ AHi≠0.
The  modification  can  be  interpreted  methodologically  not  only  as  immunising  a 
falsification, but also as modification of a part of the system, as an attempt to learn from 
experience. From the falsificationist  point of view,  Galileo took such a modifying step 
when he rejected AH0, and replaced it with AH1. 
Galileo  claims  that  his  observations  with  the  telescope  falsified  PT.  His  falsification 
supposes  AH1.  Concerning such falsifications,  one  does  (until  further examination)  not 
know that just the very PT as part of the tested system is false, except one presupposes the 
dogmatic assumption that  AH1 is true; but this is unfamiliar for a falsificationist in contrast 
to a epistemological anarchist.
In case an auxiliary hypothesis is independently testable with respect to the corresponding 
theory, and the auxiliary hypothesis corroborates, then such a hypothesis can be used as 
falsifying premiss:25 
(3) I, AH1, ¬P ⊢ ¬PT
Suppose AH1 is not independently testable. Then one can express oneself more cautious:
(4) I, ¬P ⊢ (AH1 → ¬PT)
25 The formalisation renders  the following manifest:  Some hypotheses  or  even an  isolated  hypothesis  is  
sufficient in order to derive a prediction just in case a part of the theory (i.e. the hypotheses) or a single  
hypothesis  respectively  is  independently  testable  from  the  entire  theoretical  system.  Thus  it  is  a 
conventionalist myth that always a whole theoretical system is tested or even the total knowledge; for, it is 
possible that auxiliary hypotheses, which are necessary to derive empirical prognoses from a theory, can be 
tested  independently  from  a  theory  (or  even  some  theories).  In  this  way,  the  AH1 could  be  tested 
independently from the CT and the PT.
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(4) says that PT is false, if  AH1 is true. In this sense, a falsificationist can assert that PT is 
falsified, if Galileo's observations via telescope are reliable.
Auxiliary  hypotheses  used  to  deduce  empirical  predictions  do  not  need  to  immunise 
falsifications; au contraire, they can be used in order to enable additional empirical tests. 
Considered this way, auxiliary hypotheses do not serve to immunise falsifications, but to 
test theories as strict as possible. The impression of theory-immunising only occurs, if one 
does not take into account that in these cases whole theoretical systems are empirically 
tested. If the holistic or systematic character of the empirical test is considered, then the 
use and modification of auxiliary hypotheses is neither an expression of an epistemological 
anarchism nor theory-immunising, but an application of the hypothetico-deductive method. 
A falsificationist can thus conclude: In the discussion of both astronomical theories,  AH1 
could be tested independently from PT and CT, and hence be used as falsifying premiss. In 
this way, Galileo's observations (of Venus' phases) falsified the PT.
 6. Evaluation
According  to  Feyerabend,  Galilei's  defence  of  the  Copernican  theory  (CT)  against  the 
Ptolemaic  theory  (PT)  shows  that  the  two  theories  are  optically  incommensurable. 
Equipped with the telescope, Galilei was able to conduct observations which falsified the 
PT and were in accordance with the CT. These observations, as Feyerabend notes correctly, 
were not accepted from many proponents of the  PT, because observations with the mere 
eye led to partly other results. Therefore, since competing theories would be restricted in 
their  empirical  comparability,  the  value  of  a  falsificationist  methodology  (albeit  not 
logically  impossible)  would  decrease  significantly.  In  consequence,  he  is  fooled  into 
believing that the transition from one theory to another is essentially the result of rhetoric 
and propaganda.
In Feyerabend's view,  the history of  science shows that falsified  theories can often be 
further  developed.  This  is  the  reason why it  would  be  irrational  to  abandon them.  In 
particular  new theories  would  have  to  struggle  with  considerable  difficulties  until  the 
necessary auxiliary hypotheses have been established. In this way the CT would have been 
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falsified from its birth, and Galilei could only immunise the CT against falsifications with 
the help of successively introduced ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses.26 
As we have seen, a falsificationist methodoloy is able to reply Feyerabend's theoretical 
view about the Copernican revolution, and to provide a rational reconstruction of Galilei's 
falsification of the  PT.  In particular, even a modest  falsificationist rejects Feyerabend's 
claim that the PT and the CT would be optically incommensurable. For, in this case it is 
possible  to  resolve  the  problem  of  incommensurability  by  using  optical  auxiliary 
hypotheses to test the theories in order to deduce relatively unproblematic test statements. 
If these test statements do not happen to be true, the respective theory is falsified provided 
that the particular auxiliary hypothesis can function as falsifying premiss, that is, if the 
premiss is independently testable.  
The impression of incommensurability of competing theories emerges due to Feyerabend's 
belief that theory-dependent experience cannot be discussed rationally. But this does not 
need to be true as the case of Galilei's observations exemplifies: The auxiliary hypothesis 
of  the  telescope's  reliability  was  independently  testable  from both  of  the  astronomical 
theories,  and the implicit  and competing auxiliary hypotheses (AH1 and  AH2)  could be 
expressed explicitly, and thus be topic of a critical discussion; above that, in the discussion, 
the  test  statements  which  corresponded  to  the  problematic  auxiliary  hypotheses  were 
relatively unproblematic. Seen in this light, Galilei defended the Copernican cosmology 
according to the methodological scheme of falsification. 
I can conclude that a critical rationalist can counter Feyerabend the following: It is a myth 
that the theory-dependence of experience leads thereto that different theories (world views, 
paradigmata,  cosmologies,  etc.)  cannot  be  discussed  rationally.  This  philosophically 
inspired  myth  dubbed  Popper  “The Myth  of  the  Framework”  and designated  it  as  the 
central bulwark of irrationalism.27 If one chooses this myth as base of his theoretical views, 
26 I do not argue against Feyerabend's claim that new and promising theories should be protected at  the 
beginning. However, one should thoroughly inspect if there really are immunising ad hoc hypotheses. Above 
that, it is unclear to me what it means for a hypothesis to be ad hoc.
27 Popper,  “Normal  Science  and  its  Dangers”,  pp.  56-57,  his  italics.  Popper  states  that  the  myth of  the 
framework  “exaggerates  a  difficulty  into  an  impossibility.  The  difficulty  of  discussion  between  people 
brought up in different frameworks is”, he writes, “to be admitted.” He continues with his counter-thesis a 
few lines below that “in science, as distinct from theology, a comparison of the competing theories is always 
possible.” (Ibid., p. 56-57) I am not sure, if such a discussion is always possible like radical falsificationists  
claim. Be that  as it  may, we should first  try and examine, if a discussion is possible (and perhaps even 
fruitful) and not jump to conclusions in a premature way as Feyerabend does concerning the PT and the CT. 
After we examined, whether a critical discussion is possible, there is  plenty of time left  to admit  that  a  
comparison or discussion is not possible in this case.  
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then the philosophical way leads straightforwardly to the thesis of incommensurability, and 
to the therewith conjoined meander of epistemological anarchism.
Without being a convinced falsificationist, I showed that a falsificationist methodology is 
superior  to  Feyerabend's  epistemological  anarchism,  since  the  former  can  explain  his 
prime-example, i.e. Galilei's observations, more adequately without recourse on anarchistic 
means.  In  the  first  instance,  this  does  not  sound like  an  interesting  result.  But  if  one 
considers that vast parts of Feyerabend's criticism directed to critical rationalism are based 
on this example, then one should let the result sink in again. The result suggests the attempt  
to  investigate  in  a  similar  way other  historical  case  studies which are  directed against 
falsificationism,  before  one  engages  anarchistic  means for  the  explanation  of  science's 
development.
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